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Stock Option Repricing and Executive Turnover
Jon Einar Flåtnes
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1. Introduction

1

With the increasing importance of stock options as a component of executive
compensation2, it is important to understand their effectiveness in aligning executive
interests with those of shareholders and their function as a retention device. With the
collapse of the tech stock bubble in the past three years, compensation committees of an
increasing number of firms have repriced previously granted stock options downward.
While many authors argue that downward repricing is essential to intentivize executives
and to retain valuable managers, repricing also creates a potential disincentive to
performance by granting the executive a potential windfall while the stock price
plummets. Previous studies have been focusing on the underlying factors that determine
the repricing decision, and less research has been addressing the consequences from this
board action3. This paper examines the effect of stock option repricing on executive
turnover. Do firms that choose to reprice experience a relatively lower turnover rate
among its top executives when compared to firms faced with circumstances in which
repricing might be chosen, but chose not to? This paper is divided into six sections.
Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and the existing literature on the topic.
Section 3 outlines the conceptual model and discusses the ideal data. Section 4 describes
the actual data, and develops the actual model. Section 5 shows the regression results and
discusses the findings, and section 6 concludes.
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2. Literature Review
Granting stock options to managers and employees has two functions: 1) a means of
compensation, and 2) to provide performance and retention incentives. However, if the
company’s stock price falls below the option exercise price, the options become
essentially worthless (“out-of-the-money”), and lose much of their incentive effects,
because pay-performance sensitivity decreases (Murphy, 1999). In response to this some
companies choose to reset to exercise price in order to reinstate the incentive, and to
retain good managers. However, although this practice is infrequent4, repricing is
controversial and has received much criticism from the financial press and from
institutional investors for rewarding poor performance5.

2.1. Theory
This section outlines the theory behind stock option repricing and discusses previous
research related to this topic. Economists have developed theories both for and against
stock options repricing, making the issue highly controversial. Although there is a vast
amount of empirical research done on the topic, very few theoretical studies have been
addressing the issue. What follows is a brief theoretical background on repricing.
2.1.1. Theory I: Ex-post effects of repricing
Classical agency theory states that if the interests of the shareholders and the managers
are misaligned, an alignment of the interests can occur through appropriate
incentivization that is a reward/bonus scheme. Incentive models generally assume
managers are effort and risk averse (Holmstrom, 1979). Hence, in order to maximize the
4
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net economic value to shareholders, there must exist an efficient compensation contract
between the company and the manager (Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003).
An important indicator of the quality of a pay-performance contract is the degree
to which the executive’s pay changes relative to changes in company performance,
referred to as pay-performance sensitivity. Jensen et al. (1990) and John et al. (2003)
have examined pay-performance sensitivity finding that stock options have among the
highest pay-performance sensitivities making them an efficient incentive structure when
the strike price of the options are "in-the-money" (Murphy, 1999). Moreover, the fact that
executives typically hold many options that are unvested, make them an important
retention device. Since these unvested options are forfeited upon leaving the firm
voluntarily, they serve as “golden handcuffs” that encourage executives to stay with their
current firm (Scholes (1991) and Mehran and Yermack (1997))
However, the problem arises when the stock prices fall precipitously,
considerably reducing the pay-performance sensitivity of stock options as the value of
options to purchase a stock at a price way above the market weakens the managerial
incentives and the retentive power of the stock options. If the original contract cannot be
altered, this will result in “poor continuation outcomes for the principal as well” (Acharya
et. al., 2000, p.67). For a senior executive officer who holds many underwater options at
a non-repricing firm, the prospect of obtaining a new compensation package from a
competing firm may be a compelling reason to depart. Since the costs incurred by losing
valuable executives and by hiring new ones are high, the firm might consider it profitable
to alter the terms of the original contact through repricing.
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2.1.2. Theory II: Ex-ante effects of repricing
From an ex-ante standpoint, however, the anticipation of repricing has a negative impact
on incentives present in the original contract (Acharya et. al., 2000, p. 94). Hence,
credible initial commitment by the principal not to reset contract terms will enhance the
incentive effect of the original contract.
The relative dominance of the re-incentivization and the negative feedback effect
is what determines the effectiveness of repricing.
2.2. Previous Empirical Research
The literature on stock option repricing has expanded rapidly as options have
become an increasingly common component of executive compensation. The research
can be divided into two broad categories: 1) determinants of the repricing decision, and 2)
the consequences of repricing.
Most studies on the topic have focused on the determinants of the repricing decision.
Some of the first empirical research was done by Gilson et al. (1993) who studied a sample
of 77 firms that file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt during the years 1981
to 1987. Their results show that repricing firms have under-performed the market for six
years prior to the repricing date, and that the typical repricing is a fifty percent reduction in
the exercise price.
More recent studies have analyzed the determining factors in greater depth by testing
various models (Brenner, et al., 2000; Chance, et. al. 2000, for example; see table 1 below)

Study

Table 1: Summary of studies where the dependent variable is 1 if repriced, 0 otherwise
Sample
Explanatory
Method Significant var.

5

Cross-sectional, 1994-1998, 108
repricing incidents matched with a
similar sample of restricting firms
Cross-sectional, 1998, 135 repricing
Carter et al. (2003) incidents matched with a similar
sample of non-repricing firms
Cross-sectional, 1992-1997, 127
Chidambaram et al. CEO-repricing incidents and 86
non-CEO repricing incidents
(2001)
Cross-sectional, 1998, 263 repricing
incidents matched with a similar
Carter et al. (2001) sample of non-repricing firms
Chen (2004)6

Brenner et al. (2000)

Panel data, 22,834 executive-year
observations

Cross-sectional, 1998, 52 repricing
incidents matched with a similar
Chance et al. (2000) sample of non-repricing firms
Panel data, 799 firm-month
observations
Pollock et al. (2000)
VAR

Variable description
Presence of any of five top
executives on compensation
Number of board members appointed after
BACE CEO
EXCC committee
% of executives to leave the firm
BOSE % of board seats held by top 5 executives EXTO one year in advance
BOSI Board size
EXOW Executive ownership
Dummy for whether the CEO is a
CEOC chairman
FIAG Firm age
CEOO
CEOT
CEOV
CLBO
COIN

Variable description

variables
SIZE, NOOP,
CEOT, BOSI, STVO,
CEOC
INDU, OOMN,
STRE, INRE, FIAG,
NOOU, EXTO
INDU, FIAG, BOSI,
SIZE, CEOT, INSO,
NOOP
OOMN, FIRE, SIZE,
BOSE, EXCC,
INOW, INSO
COIN, VOLA, SIZE,
STRE, MAPO,
EXOW, INRE
FRCA, OUDI, SIZE,
INOW, MABO,
STVO
OOMN, CEOC,
CEOV, CLBO,
CEOO, INSO,
BACE, SIZE

CEO ownership
CEO tenure
CEO Visiability
Classified board
Conflict of interest on compensation
committee

VAR

Cond.
logit

SIZE(+), NOOP(-),
CEOC(+)

Logit

OOMN(+), INDU(+),
NOOU(+), EXTO(+)

2-stage
probit

INDU(+), FIAG(-), BOSI(-)

Logit

OOMN(+), FIRE(-)

Logit

COIN(+), INVO(+), SIZE(-),
STRE(-)

Logit

FRCA(+), OUDI(-), SIZE(-)

Logit

OOMN(+), CEOC(+),
CEOV(-), CLBO(-),
CEOO(-), INSO(-)

VAR

Variable description

MABO Market to book
MAPO Managerial position of the executive
NOOP Number of options held by executive

FIRE
FRCA
INDU
INOW

Firm-specific return
Free cash flow
Dummies for industry
Inside ownership

NOOU Number of options outstanding
Degree to which the option is out-ofOOMN money
OUDI % outside directors
SIZE Size
STRE Stock return

INRE
INSO

Industry return
Institutional ownership

STVO Stock volatility
VOLA Industry volatility

Although they use the same dependent variable (a dummy for whether a company
has repriced or not), their independent variables, sample size, sample source and estimation
techniques are different, leading to highly conflicting results. Especially, these differences are
6
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caused by the difficulty in constructing an adequate control sample for non-repricing firms.
Chance et al. (2000) used a sample of 37 firms that repriced in the period 1985-1994, and
matched each firm with a non-repricing firm according to a set of criteria, such as prior
stock market performance, industry and size. A similar approach was taken by Chidambaran
et al. (2001) and Carter et al (2001), both of which construct a control sample of nonrepricing firms that have experienced a similar history of stock decline. Alternatively,
Brenner et al. (2000) and Pollock et al. (2001) included all the data available in the
EXECUCOMP database or those in a specific industry, and thus did not create a matched
sample. However, this approach has been criticized for omitting several factors that may be
important to the repricing decision (Carter et al., 2001), and hence the matching method
used by Carter et al. is preferable.
Although the results from the various studies differ widely, some findings are
relatively consistent. Repricing firms tend to be new, small, high technology firms with
options that are highly out-of-the-money and poor firm-specific stock performance.
The second category of studies examines the consequences of repricing on financial
performance, executive wealth, shareholder wealth and executive and employee turnover,
which is the study of the current paper.
The effect of repricing on executive turnover has been addressed in several recent
studies, none of which have found any evidence that repricing results in lower executive
turnover (Chidambaran et al., 2001; Daily, et al., 2001; Carter et al., 2001). The most
important studies are summarized in table 2:

Study

Table 2: Summary of studies where the dependent is 1 if an executive voluntarily leaves the company, 0
otherwise):
Explanatory
variables
Sample
Method Results

7
Cross-sectional, 1994-1998, 108
repricing incidents matched with a
similar sample of restricting firms

SIZE, STRE,
Probit
REST
OOMN,
Cross-sectional, 1998, 135 repricing
REPR,
incidents matched with a similar
EXTO, STRE, OLS,
sample of non-repricing firms
Carter and Lynch (2003)*
SALE, AGEE Heckman
Cross-sectional, 1992-1997, 127 CEO- SALE, STRE,
repricing incidents and 86 non-CEO INDU, REPR, 2-stage
Chidambaram et al. (2001) repricing incidents
NOSH
probit

Chen (2004)

VAR
AGEE
EXTO
NOSH
OOMN
REPR
REST
SALE
SIZE
STRE

SIZE(-), REST(-)

OOMN(+)
STRE(-), INDU,
NOSH(-), REPR(-)

Variable description
Average age of top five executives
% of executives to leave the firm one year in advance
Number of shares held by CEO
Degree to which the option is out-of-money
Repricing dummy
1 if the firm has repricing restrictions
Total sales
Total assets
Stock return

In fact, some studies have found that CEO turnover is higher for repricing firms
relative to a carefully selected control group of non-repricers, and that it stays significantly
higher over the two years following the repricing (Daily et al, 2002). Interestingly, however,
Carter et al. (2003), find that employee turnover is significantly reduced in the year following
the repricing. This is consistent with Oyer and Schaefer (2002), who suggest that options are
granted to employees primarily as a retention device, rather than providing performance
incentives.
The literature has also addressed the issue of timing of option repricings. A study
conducted by Callaghan et al. (2000) investigated the change in stock price around the
repricing date, and found that “on the day of the repricing and for about four weeks
thereafter, [there is] an increase in stock price that appears permanently impounded in future
stock price (…) In addition, repricing dates tend to either precede the release of good
news or follow the release of bad news in the quarterly earnings announcements”. These
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findings strongly suggest that managers can influence the repricing date, resulting in a
significant benefit to themselves and, thus, in an additional cost to shareholders.
Although previous empirical research has provided some very useful insights as to
why some firms choose to reprice, and identified some of the consequences of this action,
the effect of repricing on firm performance has not been thoroughly investigated. Several
studies have provided some descriptive statistics on the topic, but their findings are very
inconsistent. Chidambaran et al. (2001) document that repricing firms improve their
operating performance relative to the repricing year but do not recover their historical
profitability levels. However, they do not formally test for abnormal performance. In smallsample studies, Chance et al. (2000) find no abnormal returns in the 250-day post-repricing
period, whereas Callaghan et al. (2000) document significant positive abnormal returns over
the 120-day and 250-day post-repricing period, even for the sample period analyzed by
Chance et al. (2000).
3. Conceptual Model
Based on the theoretical rationale for repricing as outlined in section 2.1.1, we would
expect executive turnover (T) in period t+1 to be a function of whether the company
repriced its stock options in period t or not (R), in addition to a set of control variables.
Hence, we have the following basic conceptual model:
(1)

T=f(controls, R0,1)

Consistent with previous empirical research7, executive turnover is determined by four
main conceptual measures: company characteristics (C), executive characteristics (E),
pay-performance sensitivity (P) and executive labor market characteristics (M):

7
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9
(2)

T=f(C, E, P, M)
First, company characteristics include factors such as size, performance and work

environment, all of which are influential in the executive’s decision to stay with the
company or to resign. Consistent with Warner et al. (1988), we expect a positive relation
between firm size and turnover. Performance is expected to be negatively correlated with
turnover, because positive performance is indicative of good leadership, and thus an
executive is more likely to stay in a position in which he/she does a high-quality job. A
stimulating work environment is also predicted to reduce executive turnover.
Second, executive characteristics include among others, age, and the degree to
which the company’s interests and executive interests are aligned. If executives’ being
closer to retirement leads to higher turnover, we expect a positive relation between age
and turnover. On the other hand, if young executives are more mobile and less loyal to
the firm, we expect a negative relation between age and turnover8.
An improvement of the pay-performance sensitivity is also expected to provide a
greater incentive for executives to stay with the firm, and hence reduce turnover. Since
the intention of repricing is to raise the pay-performance sensitivity, this is the
mechanism through which repricing is expected to reduce turnover.
Finally, the characteristics of the executive labor market are important
determinants of an executive’s decision to leave the company. If other companies offer
better compensation packages, and a more attractive work environment, executives will
be more likely to quit.
As suggested by previous literature, a regression using model (2) could potentially
lead to inconsistent estimates. The repricing decision and the resignation by an executive
8
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could happen simultaneously, possibly generating a sample selection bias. The
endogeneity can be corrected for by using the two-step procedure as suggested in
Heckman (1979). In the first step, we estimate a probit model for the repricing decision.
The second stage uses the inverse Mills ratio to estimate a consistent model of executive
turnover. Hence, our conceptual model contains the following system of equations:
(3)

T=f(C, E, P, M, R0,1)

(4)

R0,1=f(C, P, M)
Model (4) is based on previous empirical literature, discussed in section 2.2. It states

that the repricing decision is based on company characteristics, current pay-performance
sensitivity, and executive labor market characteristics.

3.1. Ideal Data
Ideally, we would be able to measure voluntary turnover separately from forced
resignation. Since we are only interested in the effect repricing has on executives’
decision to stay with the company or not, the cases where the executive’s contract is
being terminated by the company will introduce a bias to our estimates.
Data on company characteristics would ideally include accurate performance data
based on a large set of financial measures, and data on the company’s work environment,
such as the executive’s relationship with other employees and the physical setting in
which the executive is working. Although these factors are difficult to measure, they
could possibly be captured using a company level survey.
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Executive characteristics are also hard to quantify. However, ideal data would
include measures of the executive’s age, family situation, career plans and whether or not
his goals are aligned with those of the company.
Ideal data on the pay-performance sensitively would take into account the fact
that the performance of a company can be due to exogenous factors or to factors directly
attributable to an executive. Hence, ideally we would be able to measure the degree to
which the company’s performance can be directly related to actions taken by the
executive. This would allow us to compute the impact this has on the executive’s
compensation.
The characteristics of the labor market for executives could ideally be measured
as a set of variables capturing the relative attractiveness of job offers in other companies.
Data would include details, such as compensation, of all the job offers available to the
executive at any point in time.
Finally, in order to best examine the impact of repricing on executive turnover,
we would ideally obtain data on when the executive makes the decision to resign as
opposed to when his resignation is announced. Moreover, panel data would make it
possible to compare a repricing event with another point in time when the same company
faced the same economic situation, but chose not to reprice. In addition, we would ideally
get data on when the managers knew about the repricing, in contrast to when the
repricing actually occurs.

4. Actual Data and Variables
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Unfortunately, our data are far from ideal. However, consistent with previous research,
we use overall executive turnover as a proxy for voluntary turnover. Moreover, in order
to estimate CEO turnover, we also use a limited dependent variable which takes one if the
CEO leaves the company in the year of repricing, and zero otherwise. The data are found
by manually scanning through proxy statements for each company over several years in
order to determine which executives appeared on the compensation table for a given year,
but not for the next year9. Proxy statements are available from EdgarOnline10.
As a proxy for company characteristics, we use book value of assets to capture
size, and past stock performance to approximate company performance. This is consistent
with most previous research. Also, as suggested by several empirical studies, industry
dummies significantly account for differences in executive turnover, and thus will be
included in our model. All these data are available from the COMPUSTAT database.
Data on executive characteristics are not only unavailable, but the measures are
often hard to quantify. Hence, merely CEO age will be used, since it is available from
proxy statements and is believed to have a significant impact on CEO turnover11.
As suggested by previous empirical research, the percentage of common shares
held by the executive is a good proxy for pay-performance sensitivity. Although it does
not correct for the fact that performance might be attributable to factors over which the
executive has had no influence, it should be a good measure of how responsive an

9

Each company must submit a proxy statement to the SEC annually. This contains, among others,
compensation data for all executives whose salary exceeds $100,000 a year, in addition to data on
executives’ ages, and beneficiary ownership (only reported for those who own more than 1% of common
stock)
10
http://textsearch.edgarexplorer.com/prosearch.asp
11
Carter et al. (2003) is the only study using the age variable. However, instead of CEO age, they used the
average age for all executives listed in the proxy statement.
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executive’s compensation is to the general stock performance of the company. Data on
common shares held by the largest shareholders are available from proxy statements.
No previous studies have used measures that capture the characteristics of the
executive labor market, since data on the details of executive job openings are not
publicly available for a large number of companies. Hence, although this certainly is an
important determinant of executive turnover, we will not include it in our model due to
data unavailability.
Stock option repricing data are available from the EXECUCOMP database.
Unfortunately, however, I do not have access to this database, and I therefore obtained
my data by performing a search on EdgarOnline and scanning through firms’ proxy
statements. As noted in section 2.2, a similar technique was employed by Carter et al.
(2001), and although it gives accurate data on the repricing date, this method limits the
sample size due to very time-consuming data collection process.
Data were compiled by first identifying repricing instances (i.e. company name
and repricing date), and then collecting the appropriate data for the year of repricing, the
preceding year, and the succeeding year. Consistent with previous research, a control
sample was also created, consisting of firms that most closely matched the decline in
performance for each company during the six months prior to the repricing incident, but
chose not to reprice. Hence, our final dataset contains cross-sectional data for 62
companies and 73 repricing instances.
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4.1. Actual Model
Based on the theory outlined in previous sections and the availability of data, we employ
the following model (expected signs are in parentheses):
(5) CEOTURN(0,1)i= ßo + ß1log(SIZEi,) + ß2STRET[-12, -6]i + ß3 STRET[-6, 0]i +
(+)
(-)
(-)
ß4STRET[0, 6]i, + ß5HITECH(0,1)i + ß6EXETURN[-12,0]i +
(-)
(+)
(+)
ß7CEOAGEi +ß8CEOSHARESi + ß9REPRICE(0,1)i+ T
(+/-)
(-)
(-)
where the variables are defined as follows:
CEOTURN(0,1) = 1 if the CEO leaves the company during the year of repricing or during
the following year; 0 otherwise
SIZE = Book value of assets
STRET[X, Y] = Stock return between month X and Y where X and Y are the months
relative to the repricing event.
HITECH(0,1) = 1 if the company is a technology firm (as defined by the SIC code); 0
otherwise
EXETURN[-12,0] = Number of top-five executives who leave the company during the
one year preceding the repricing event.
CEOAGE = The age of the CEO at the time of repricing.
CEOSHARES = The percentage of common stock owned by the CEO.
REPRICE(0,1) = 1 if the stock options were repriced; 0 otherwise
Each variable is given for firm i.
The justifications for the expected signs are based on the discussion in section 2 and 3.
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Although the sign on SIZE can be ambiguous, it has been argued in the literature
that larger firms are expected to have higher executive turnover due to a larger degree of
agency problems. Such problems are more pronounced in larger, mature firms which
have more diffuse ownership and greater separation between ownership and control12.
Thus we expect a positive sign on SIZE.
Since higher past and current stock returns are indicative of good leadership,
executives are more likely to stay in a successful position, than in one under which
performance has declined. Moreover, positive stock returns will increase the value of the
stocks and options owned by the executive, and hence he/she has an incentive to stay
with the company, since these unvested options are forfeited upon leaving the firm
voluntarily. Hence, we expect a negative sign for all the stock return variables.
Technology firms were shown to have higher executive turnover rates by Carter et
al. (2001). Since the technology sector is generally more risky, executives would tend to
be more mobile than in other sectors. Thus, we expect a positive sign on HITECH(0,1).
Past executive turnover could be an indication that the company has trouble
retaining its executives. Hence, we would expect to see higher turnover in companies
with a history of frequent executive turnover. Thus, a negative sign is expected for the
EXETURN[-12,0] variable.
If executives’ being closer to retirement leads to higher turnover, we expect a
positive relation between age and turnover. On the other hand, if young executives are
more mobile and less loyal to the firm, we expect a negative relation between age and
turnover. Thus the predicted sign of CEOAGE is ambivalent.

12

Chidambaran et al. (2001), Warner et al. (1988)
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The CEOSHARES variable is expected to be negatively correlated with executive
turnover, since higher executive ownership of common stock will increase the payperformance sensitivity. Hence, we predict a negative sign.
Repricing is expected to reduce CEO turnover by reinstating the retentive power
of the executive stock options. Thus, we should see a negative sign for REPRICE(0,1)

In order to correct for the potential endogeneity of the REPRICE variable, we also
estimate the following simultaneous system of equations using a two-stage Heckman
procedure. We also use overall executive turnover as the dependent variable instead of
CEO turnover:
(6) EXETURNi= ßo + ß1log(SIZEi,) + ß2STRET[-12, -6]i + ß3 STRET[-6, 0]i +
(+)
(-)
(-)
ß4STRET[0, 6]i, + ß5HITECH(0,1)i + ß6EXETURN[-12,0]i +
(-)
(+)
(+)
ß7REPRICE(0,1)i+ T
(-)
(7) REPRICE(0,1)i= ßo + ß1log(SIZEi,) + ß2STRET[-12, -6]i + ß3 STRET[-6, 0]i +
(+/-)
(-)
(-)
ß4STRET[0, 6]i, + ß5HITECH(0,1)i + ß6EXETURN[-12,0]i +
(-)
(+)
(+)
ß7CEOSHARESi + T
(+)

17
5. Results
The results obtained by estimating the probit model in (5) are displayed in table 3:
Table 3:
Probit regression of model (5). Dependent variable is 1 if the CEO leaves the company
during the year of repricing or the following year, 0 otherwise. Z-statistics are in
parenthesis.
Variable
Intercept

Predicted
Sign

Log(Sales)
(+)
Return [-12,-6]
(-)
Return [-6,0]
(-)
Return [0,6]
(-)
Technology
(Dummy)
Exec. Resign [-12,0]

(+)
(+)

CEO Age
(+/-)
% Shares held by CEO
(-)
CEO Options Repriced
(Dummy)
N
Pseudo R2
Log likelihood
2

(p-value)

(-)

Marginal Effects
(dy/dx)

Coeff.
-1.876
(-1.54)
-0.280
(-2.75)***
0.525
(1.72)*
-0.429
(-0.8)
-0.804
(-2.08)**
-0.045
(-0.09)
-0.316
(-1.08)
0.048
(2.06)**
-2.140
(-0.95)
-0.934
(-1.22)
74

-0.046
0.086
-0.070
-0.131
-0.007
-0.051
0.008
-0.349
-0.229

0.33
-23.06
22.65 (0.01)

*=Significant on a 10% level; **=Significant on a 5% level; ***=Significant on a 1% level
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As apparent from table 3, the variables log(sales), return [-12,-6], return [0,6] and
CEO age are significant in explaining CEO turnover. However, we find no evidence that
repricing is associated with lower CEO turnover, as the relation between CEO turnover
and the repricing dummy is not significant at conventional levels. Nevertheless, the sign
is as predicted, which is a weak indication that turnover is lower in repricing firms.
Surprisingly, on the other hand, we find the coefficient for log(sales), the measure
for size, to be negative and significant at a 1% level. This implies that smaller firms have
higher CEO turnover, which conflicts with the findings in Carter et al. (2003),
Chidambaran et al. (2001), Warner et al. (1988) and most other empirical studies. Hence,
either our model is incorrectly specified or since our sample has an overrepresentation of
repricing firms, it is possible that among repricing firms, size is negatively correlated
with turnover.
Furthermore, we observe that stock return for the six months preceding the
repricing event and the six months following it is negatively correlated with CEO
turnover, as predicted. The marginal effects are -.07 and -.13, respectively, implying that
a 100% increase in stock return during the six months leading up to the options being
repriced, is associated with a 7% decline in the probability that the CEO leaves the
company. The decline is 13% when considering stock return for the six months following
the repricing. However, stock return for the next six months preceding the repricing event
shows a significant positive correlation with turnover. Although this result is hard to
explain, it could be due to a potential negative correlation between stock return for
successive intervals, caused by cyclical stock price fluctuations.

19
The dummy for technology firms has a negative coefficient, which conflicts with
the theory that these firms have higher CEO turnover. However, since the finding is not
significant, no interpretations can be made based on this result.
A similar conclusion can be made for the executive resignations [-12, 0] variable.
One would expect to observe a higher probability of CEO turnover in those companies
with a history of high executive turnover. However, since our findings yield a negative,
insignificant coefficient, these results should not be relied upon.
The coefficient on CEO age, on the other hand, is highly significant, and its
positive sign is consistent with the theory that CEOs who are closer to retirement have a
higher probability of resigning. Our results imply that a CEO, whose age is twice that of
another CEO, has a 0.008% higher chance of leaving the company.
Moreover, the percentage of shares held by the CEO has a negative, but not
significant, coefficient. This is consistent with the theory that higher CEO ownership of
common stock increases the pay-performance sensitivity, and hence reduces turnover.
The marginal effect of 0.35 implies that the impact is relatively large; however, since the
coefficient is not significant, this result might be due to randomness.
As outlined in previous sections, the potential endogeneity of the repricing
variable could introduce a selection bias, and hence make the estimates in model (5)
inconsistent. Therefore, in order to obtain consistent estimators, we run a Heckman twostage procedure, where the first stage is a probit model where CEO repricing (0,1) is the
dependent variable, and the second stage uses the inverse Mills ratio to estimate overall
executive turnover13. Table 4 displays the results from this regression:

13

Executive turnover is used instead of CEO turnover, since the latter variable only includes a few positive
cases (i.e. where the value of the dummy is 1)
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Table 4:
First column is an OLS regression of model (6). T-statistics are in parenthesis. Third
column shows the first stage of a Heckman and is thus a probit regression where CEO
repricing (0,1) is the dependent variable. Column two shows the second stage of the
Heckman using the inverse Mills ratio generated from the first stage. Z-statistics are in
parenthesis.
OLS
Heckman St. 2 Heckman St. 1
Variable
Intercept

Predicted
Sign

Log(Sales)
(+)
Return [-12,-6]
(-)
Return [-6,0]
(-)
Return [0,6]
(-)
Technology
(Dummy)
Exec. Resign [-12,0]

(+)
(+)

Executive
Turnover
-0.546
(-1.13)
0.082
(1.32)
-0.502
(-2.29)**
-0.326
(-1.17)
-0.287
(-1.44)
0.954
(3.23)***
0.231
(1.3)

Executive
Turnover
0.355
(0.94)
0.074
(0.83)
-0.467
(-1.87)*
-0.470
(-1.27)
-0.366
(-1.26)
1.033
(3.27)***
0.237
(1.05)

CEO Repriced
1.648
(2.59)***
-0.203
(-1.63)*
0.820
(1.08)
-0.448
(-1.17)
-0.563
(-1.6)*
0.228
(0.42)
0.640
(1.43)

CEO Age
% Shares held by CEO
CEO Options Repriced
(Dummy)
Inverse Mills Ratio
N

(-)

1.027
(2.36)**
0.412
74

2

Adj. R
F-stat (p-value)
2

0.066
(0.05)

(0.30)
74

74

0.16
3.05 (0.01)

22.39 (0.03)
(p-value)
*=Significant on a 10% level; **=Significant on a 5% level; ***=Significant on a 1%
level
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The results in table 4 show that all signs are as expected except for the repricing variable,
which in the OLS regression has a positive and significant coefficient. This could be due
to the potential endogeneity of repricing, and thus column two will give more consistent
estimates. We observe, however, that the other variables remain relatively unchanged14.
Two striking differences between the results from model (5) and model (6) is that
for model (6), executive turnover is, as expected, positively related to both size and the
technology dummy. The fact that such a positive relationship was lacking when using
CEO turnover as the dependent variable, could be due to the fact that this variable only
contains a few incidents of actual CEO turnover, and hence we would need a larger
sample in order to get accurate and significant estimates.

6. Conclusion
Despite the fact that many companies resort to repricing as a method of reinstating the
retentive power of stock options that have fallen far below their exercise price, this
practice has received strong criticism from the financial press and institutional investors
for rewarding managers for poor performance, and some see it as an example of
managerial entrenchment. This study examines the hypothesis that repricing results in
lower executive turnover. Specifically, we estimate a model of executive turnover as a
function of company size, past and current stock returns, industry, past turnover, CEO
age, CEO ownership of company shares and a dummy specifying whether executive
stock options have been repriced. Our results do not support the hypothesis that repricing
reduces neither executive turnover nor CEO turnover. However, we do find evidence that

14

A Hausman test between the OLS regression and the Heckman model shows that we can reject the
hypothesis that the OLS model is exogenous.
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past and current stock return, company size and CEO age are significant in explaining
CEO turnover. Moreover, our results indicate that overall executive turnover is
significantly higher in technology firms and lower in companies with positive past stock
returns. Our findings are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of the
repricing decision. Overall, our results provide little support for firms’ arguments for
repricing executive stock options.
Since data are lacking for some important determinants of executive turnover, the
results from previous studies, including the current study, might not be valid. Hence,
future research would focus on compiling data for a larger set of variables, such as
characteristics of the executive labor market. Moreover, if the proposed law is
implemented that would require shareholder approval of repricing, this would open up a
new set of questions regarding stock option repricing, performance and retention.
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